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 Abstract 
We will show that Carl Stumpf’s interpretation of the concept of probability is best 
understood as that of an objective Bayesian. First we analyse Stumpf’s work in 
relation to that of his contemporary Johannes von Kries, and after that we will 
discuss various ways in which Stumpf’s probability-concept has been construed. 
By showing that the construals of Stumpf’s account by Hans Reichenbach, Richard 
von Mises and Andreas Kamlah are unfair – and at some points incorrect – we 
uncover the aspects that are essential to Stumpf’s probability interpretation.  
 
1. Introduction 
It has been claimed that some time before the turn of the 19th into the 20th 
century there was a paradigm-shift à la Kuhn in our scientific views on 
probability-theory1. The validity of this claim (or at least its content) is not 
generally agreed upon2, but it is not contested that this was a turbulent period in 
the history of probability theory. The existence of such a turbulent period is 
supported by the fact that the issues that were debated and the arguments that 
were used in discussions about probability theory in this period are ubiquitous in 
20th century philosophy of science. Obvious traces of the argumentations of John 
Stuart Mill and John Venn can be found in every frequentist probability 
interpretation almost 150 years after these scholars wrote their works. 
 In this paper we focus on a specific part of the probability-debate that took 
place in the generation after that of Venn and Mill. In the 1880’s and 1890’s 
Johannes von Kries and Carl Stumpf both defended their own reading of the 
‘classical’ definition of probability that was due to Laplace. Just as other parts of 
the probabilistic debate the traces of the debate between Stumpf and von Kries 
extend very far. We will analyse several representations of Stumpf’s side of the 
                                           
1 (Kruger, Daston, & Heidelberger, 1987) 
2 (Hacking, Was there a probabilistic revolution, 1800-1930?, 1983) 
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debate, and we will argue that in none of these representations Stumpf’s view is 
accurately classified. 
 In the next section we will introduce Laplace’s definition of probability to 
prepare for an analysis of the arguments of Stumpf and von Kries themselves. 
The analysis of these arguments are the subject of the third and fourth sections. 
In the fifth section we will describe several ways in which Stumpf’s view on 
probability has been understood. This description will be followed by a detailed 
investigation of the modern interpretations of probability which are closest to the 
view of Stumpf. In the final section of this paper we apply the results of our 
investigation to the various representations of Stumpf and draw our own 
conclusion as to how best to classify Stumpf’s probability-concept. 
2. Interpretations of Laplace 
The ‘traditional’ interpretation of probability is that defended by Laplace in his 
Philosophical essay on probabilities (Laplace, 1812). In this work, Laplace 
considers the concept of probability to be applicable in the following way:  
 
“The theory of chance consists in reducing all events of the same kind to a 
certain number of cases equally possible, that is to say, to such as we may 
be equally undecided about in regard to their existence, and in 
determining the number of cases favourable to the event whose 
probability is sought. The ratio of this number to that of all the cases 
possible is the measure of this probability, which is thus simply a fraction 
whose numerator is the number of favourable cases and whose 
denominator is the number of all cases possible.” (Laplace, 1812, p. 6) 
 
The apparent straightforwardness of this quotation hides a number of difficulties. 
For instance, it is not clear from Laplace’s words which ‘events’ should be 
regarded as ‘of the same kind’. It is therefore also not clear to which events the 
probability-concept should be applied. The related – but not identical – difficulty 
we shall be concerned with here is that of the cases which are ‘equally possible’. 
How can we justify the statement that certain cases or events are equally 
possible? 
The concept of equipossibility had been around for at least a century 
before Laplace wrote his essay. There are two problems with the concept of 
equipossibility and its use in interpreting probability. The first problem is that we 
must discover what are the cases that are said to be equipossible in Laplace’s 
definition. The second problem is that – once it is clear what they are – we must 
somehow justify the inference from equipossibility to equiprobability (without 
such an inference, Laplace’s definition would not be about probability). It is not 
clear how Laplace can distinguish equipossibility from equiprobability and it is 
obvious that the use of the concept of equiprobability in defining probability is 
problematic – to say the least (Hacking, 1971). This problem has been addressed 
by many later authors (such as (von Kries, 1886), (von Mises, 1928), and 
(Reichenbach, 1949)). However, because the first problem of equipossibility plays 
a more important role in the work of Stumpf, we shall not consider the 
justification of the inference from equipossibility to equiprobability and focus on 
the problem of reference – what is the nature of the favourable and the possible 
cases in Laplace’s definition of probability?  
Laplace says in his essay that probabilistic judgments are partly relative to 
our knowledge and partly relative to the limits of this knowledge. When we want 
to describe some chance-event about whose outcome we are uncertain we use 
our knowledge of the situation to determine the numbers of favourable and 
possible cases. Furthermore, it is necessary that we have no knowledge 
whatsoever to prefer any of the cases over the others: we must be “equally 
undecided” about them. This means that probabilistic judgments about an event 
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say something about the level of our knowledge about this event. Laplace is not 
always clear about this3. At certain points in his essay he states that the 
equipossibility must always correspond to some physical equality. This would lead 
us to believe that probabilistic judgments say something about objective, physical 
reality (as opposed to our incomplete knowledge thereof). We may conclude that 
Laplace is ambiguous about this matter; strictly speaking, it does not follow from 
the classical probability interpretation that the favourable and the possible cases 
in the probability definition should refer to either our (deficient) knowledge or to 
some physically existing structure.  
3. Johannes von Kries 
A fervent defender of an interpretation of probability in terms of objectively 
existing structure is the German physiologist Johannes von Kries. In 1886 von 
Kries wrote an account of his interpretation in his `Principien der 
Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung – eine logische Untersuchung' (von Kries, 1886).  In 
this work von Kries invokes the notion of event spaces and a rule to assign 
measures to them. 
Consider the example of the roll of a die. Together the roll’s outcomes 
constitute a `universe of events', in which each of the six possible outcomes has 
its own `event-space'. But these event-spaces can be split up further: each 
outcome can be realized by very many microscopic configurations that all 
manifest themselves macroscopically in the same way (which is why they belong 
to the same event-space). The probability of an outcome can therefore be 
calculated if we are able to somehow assign a measure to this `space' of more 
fundamental microscopic events. This thought leads von Kries to define the 
probability of a specific outcome as the ratio of the size of its specific event space 
to the size of the totality of all event-spaces, corresponding to all possible 
outcomes. It is then possible to say which events are equiprobable – namely the 
events whose event spaces are of equal size. Given the symmetries of the 
situation, this procedure plausibly leads to assigning equal probabilities to all 
possible results of the throw of a fair die: one in six. 
But what if our die is biased, loaded in such a way that the sides are not 
equipossible? Von Kries argues that in such cases we could and should trace back 
the causal nexus until we find event-spaces that do not split up anymore if the 
causal nexus is traced back even further. Suppose we do so in the case of the 
die: we start tracing back the chain of causes, going to a more fundamental level 
of description. Given the asymmetries in the physical situation (the die is loaded) 
we shall find that the number of initial states, in a (sub)microscopic description, 
that leads to one outcome will not be the same for all outcomes (we assume that 
the mechanism of casting the die is the same in all cases). When we go back 
even further in the causal nexus, allowing even more basic descriptions, these 
initial microstates will not split up any further, at least not in an asymmetric way. 
Von Kries dubs the event-spaces that do not split up further `elementary' event-
spaces. The basic principle of von Kries' method is to take these elementary 
event-spaces as equipossible. So we have to continue our causal analysis until we 
find `simple, non-composite' causes; the elementary event spaces we thus 
ultimately arrive at will perhaps be defined in terms of the states of the individual 
atoms of which the die consists4. So for every chance event there are elementary 
event-spaces, but not every possible outcome needs to have the same number of 
elementary event-spaces associated with it. If, in the case of the biased die, we 
                                           
3 Cf. (Hacking, Was there a probabilistic revolution, 1800-1930?, 1983, p. 353) 
for a similar conclusion about Laplace. 
4 The atomic concept had not yet gained general acceptance in von Kries' time, 
but ‘small quantities of matter’ could serve a similar explanatory role. 
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ask for the chance of six coming out, we should consider the totality of possible 
microscopic configurations (N), and determine the number of these that will lead 
to the desired outcome (n). The sought-for probability is then the ratio n/N. 
4. Carl Stumpf 
Seven years after von Kries had published his defence of an objectively based 
theory of probability which featured his notion of event-spaces, the psychologist 
and philosopher Carl Stumpf (1848-1936) held a lecture for the Bavarian 
Academy of the sciences (On the concept of mathematical probability (Stumpf, 
1892a) in which he criticised von Kries' objective  interpretation of probability. In 
his magnum opus `Erkenntnislehre', published three years after his death 
(Stumpf, 1940), Stumpf even writes that it was von Kries’ theory of event-spaces 
that had motivated him to put into words his own views on the matter. In an 
addendum to the lecture held in 1892 (On the application of the mathematical 
concept of probability to a part of a continuum) (Stumpf, 1892b) Stumpf says 
that it does not follow from Laplace's theory that the equipossibility of cases 
should be founded on physical symmetries5. What Stumpf does agree on is 
Laplace's general definition of probability: 
 
“We say that a certain event has a probability of n/N if we can regard it as 
one of n favourable cases within a total of N possible cases, of which we 
know only one is real, but we don't know which.”6 
 
Stumpf argues that there is a requirement that this definition must meet. 
Probability must be defined in such a way that statements about degrees of 
probability of the occurrence of some event correspond to the degrees of rational 
expectation (“vernünftigen Erwartung” (Stumpf, 1892a, p. 56)) about this event 
that any rational observer would actually have. Stumpf says that “probability-
theory is nothing but the mathematical justification of common sense.” (Stumpf, 
1892a, p. 39). Stumpf recognises as the central feature of the concept of 
probability that probabilistic statements are disjunctive statements. The different 
members of such a probabilistic disjunction correspond to the favourable and the 
possible cases of Laplace. The foremost requirement for such a probabilistic 
disjunction is that all available knowledge about a physical situation is used when 
formulating a probabilistic statement about this situation. A demand that springs 
from this requirement is that also all causal knowledge should be used. 
We will explain this with an example of a toss with a symmetrical coin. 
The coin has two identical sides, so the probabilistic disjunction consists 
of two members. Suppose, however, that we know that in this particular 
experiment the mechanical causes are such that the two possible outcomes 
correspond to two sets of initial conditions for the toss whose cardinality is not 
equal. In that case, Stumpf argues, we should use that causal knowledge to 
arrive at a disjunction which is different from the original disjunction that was 
based on knowledge of the coin only. Stumpf does not argue that all probabilistic 
knowledge should ultimately be based on causal knowledge. However, if 
such knowledge is available then the members of the disjunction should be 
                                           
5 „In meinem Vortrage, ‚Über den Begriff...‘ habe ich in Consequenz der 
Wahrscheinlichkeitsdefinition von Laplace gegenüber neueren Auffassungen daran 
festgehalten, dass zur Wahrscheinlichkeitsbestimmung physische Gleichheit der 
sog. gleichmöglichen fälle nicht erforderlich sei.“ (Stumpf, 1892b, p. 681) 
6 „Jede beliebige Urteilsmaterie nennen wir n/N Wahrscheinlich, wen wir sie 
auffassen können als eines von n gliedern (günstigen Fällen) innerhalb einer 
gesamtzahl von N gliedern (möglichen Fällen), von denen wir wissen, dass eines 
und nur eines wahr ist, dagegen slechterdings nicht wissen welches.“ (Stumpf, 
1892a, p. 48) 
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traced back to their causes and the members of the updated probabilistic 
disjunction should describe these causes.  
Stumpf’s interpretation of probability differs markedly from the 
interpretation espoused by von Kries. It is true that Stumpf, just as von Kries, 
believes that we should use available causal knowledge in formulating statements 
of probability, but Stumpf does not agree with von Kries that it follows from that 
that probabilistic judgments should be based solely on physically existing 
structures. Stumpf’s side in the debate with von Kries on probability has been 
represented in various ways. In the following section we will discuss several of 
such representations. Their analysis will provide us with what is necessary to 
reach our own conclusion on how Stumpf’s work should be interpreted and allow 
us to accurately place Stumpf within the history of probability-theory.   
5. Interpretations of Stumpf 
The first representation of Stumpf’s views on probability which we will be 
concerned with here is that by the philosopher of science Hans Reichenbach. In 
1915 Reichenbach wrote his dissertation in which he formulated a neokantian 
interpretation of the concept of probability (The Concept of Probability in the 
Mathematical Representation of Reality, 1915)7. Reichenbach begins his work 
with an account of what he believes should be the major point of concern in the 
contemporary debate about probability. In order to prepare for a discussion of his 
own view Reichenbach represents the interpretations of Stumpf and von Kries as 
two opposing ways of interpreting Laplace’s classical definition. Reichenbach 
argues that if the concept of probability is to play a role in science, then it should 
be wholly objectively interpreted – a change in probability can only exist if there 
is a corresponding change in physical reality. Without treating Stumpf’s views in 
any detail Reichenbach virtually dismisses Stumpf’s view as naively subjective. 
Reichenbach does not doubt the internal consistency of Stumpf’s probability 
concept, but he argues that if we adopt Stumpf’s view, we are not justified in 
taking probability judgments as a basis for rational expectation: 
 
“Der Stumpfsche Wahrscheinlichkeitsbegriff ist zwar in sich 
widerspruchslos, und kann deshalb nicht falsch genannt werden, da 
Definitionen willkürlich sind. Aber er leistet jedenfalls nicht das, was man 
allgemein von einem Wahrscheinlichkeitsbegriff verlangt. Denn er ist nicht 
geeignet, ein Mass der vernünftigen Erwartung abzugeben.” (Reichenbach, 
1915, p. 46) 
 
Reichenbach was not alone in his appraisal of Stumpf’s views on probability. One 
of the founders of the 20th century frequentist interpretation of probability, the 
Ukrainian born mathematician Richard von Mises, calls Stumpf the main 
representative (Hauptvertreter) of the subjectivist interpretation of probability 
(von Mises, 1928, p. 269). A more recent (and more elaborate) account of 
Stumpf’s probability concept is due to Andreas Kamlah (The decline of the 
Laplacian theory of probability: a study of Stumpf, von Kries, and Meinong, 
1987). Kamlah argues that Stumpf’s interpretation should be understood as 
equivalent with Carnap’s logical interpretation. In the course of an analysis of 
Stumpf’s view, Kamlah provides us with a definition of Stumpf’s probability that is 
“better than his [Stumpf’s] own” (Kamlah, 1987, p. 102). Kamlah gives a 
formalised version of Stumpf’s own definition in terms of propositions which is in 
line with Stumpf’s remark that statements of probability are statements about 
logical relations (“logische Zusammenhänge”) (Stumpf, 1892a, p. 99). It should 
                                           
7 Cf. (Eberhardt, 2011) for an appraisal of Reichenbach’s dissertation and 
(Benedictus & Dieks, 2014) for a brief exposition of Reichenbach’s rejection of 
Stumpf. 
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be clear here that Kamlah attempts to precisify Stumpf’s definition in order to 
explicate what Stumpf actually meant (and not in order to give his own view on 
the matter).  In the next section we will analyse several different contemporary 
interpretations of the probability-concept that are intimately related to the views 
of Stumpf. 
6. Bayesianism 
In the fourth section of his main lecture in 1892 (1892a), Stumpf confesses 
himself to be a subjective Bayesian (Stumpf, 1892a, p. 96). It will become 
apparent that this remark, although it appears only in the final section of 
Stumpf’s account, is very important for the issues dealt with in this paper. 
The central idea of the Bayesian interpretation of probability is that 
degrees of probability correspond to the degrees of belief of some observer. For 
example, consider the probability of some event taking place and assume that 
there is a certain piece of evidence in favour of the event’s actual happening (in 
case of a die-throw the evidence might be an observed relative frequency within a 
sequence of outcomes of earlier throws). The Bayesian now distinguishes 
between prior and posterior probability. The prior probability corresponds to the 
observer’s degree of belief in the actual happening of the event before the 
evidence comes into play, and the posterior probability corresponds to the 
observer’s degree of belief in the actual happening of the event after the evidence 
has come into play. Let A be the event whose probability we are interested in, 
and let B represent the evidence in A’s favour. If we denote the prior probability 
of A as P(A) and the posterior probability of A as P(A|B) then the Bayesian 
holds that the change in degree of belief should follow Bayes’ formula (otherwise 
the observer would not be rational): 
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        (1) 
 
It is not the validity of this formula that distinguishes Bayesianism from other 
interpretations of probability. Rather, this distinction lies in the fact that the 
Bayesian equates the prior and posterior degrees of probability that are fed into 
the above equation as degrees of belief. 
 Two types of Bayesianism are current in the literature8: objective and 
subjective Bayesianism. The distinction between the two types is clear, but it is 
not always unequivocal to which of the camps a Bayesian mathematician or 
philosopher belongs. This ambiguity results from the fact that not many 
Bayesians would call their view either purely subjective or purely objective9. 
Although the different types  (together with most other interpretations of 
probability) agree in that any rational observer should update her degrees of 
belief following equation (1), the objective and the subjective Bayesian differ in 
their characterisation of prior probabilities.  
In a purely objective Bayesian view there are rational constraints that fully 
determine the prior probabilities that go into equation (1). If certain evidence 
regarding some event is available to an observer (ie. if the body of knowledge an 
agent possesses is fixed), then according to a purely objective Bayesian there is 
                                           
8 Cf. (Talbott, 2008) for a concise account of how subjective Bayesianism differs 
from objective Bayesianism.  
9 There certainly are some of such ‘extremists’. Bruno de Finetti is an example of 
a purely subjective Bayesian. (Talbott, 2008) maintains that no contemporary 
Bayesian is purely objective. Also, (Chalmers, 1976, p. 178) argues that purely 
objective Bayesianism is not a feasible position as its adherents cannot cope with 
empirically equivalent hypotheses. 
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only one degree of belief regarding the probability of the event available to this 
observer. This uniquely determined degree of belief is what a purely objective 
Bayesian calls the degree of probability.  
In a purely subjective Bayesian view such rational constraints on prior 
probabilities are wholly absent. According to a purely subjective Bayesian the 
prior probabilities can take on any value between zero and one; for an observer 
to be rational it is enough that she updates her degrees of belief following Bayes’ 
formula (1). Most versions of Bayesianism are somewhere between purely 
objective and purely subjective;10 they vary in their appraisal of the extent to 
which there are rational restraints on the Bayesian prior probabilities. 
 The logical interpretation of probability is intimately related to 
Bayesianism.11 The modern-day form of the logical interpretation is mostly due to 
the work of Rudolf Carnap. Carnap has written about his logicality view on 
probability in many earlier publications, but the first book in which he gives a 
detailed account of his probabilistic logic appeared in 1950 (Logical Foundations 
of Probability). In this work Carnap defines probability as a relation between 
propositions within a language. To show how that works he considers a simple 
model of a language which consists solely of names and predicates. Such a 
language can be used to describe a model-world which consists only of a number 
of objects to which the names refer. In our model-world there is only one 
characteristic which each of the objects either has or does not have. Provided 
with such a language we can draw up a full description of our world. Such a 
description – which lists all objects whether they have the characteristic or not – 
Carnap calls a state description. Different state descriptions correspond to 
different linguistic statements about our model-world. 
Probability, in Carnap’s logical view, is defined as a measure m(-) over all 
possible state descriptions. This measure automatically extends over all possible 
sentences within the language that we use, so Carnap’s probability could be said 
to express nothing but a logical relation between sentences within a language. 
The probability measure in turn allows Carnap to define a confirmation function, 
c(h,e), which formalises the relation between propositions about evidence (e) 
and propositions which express a hypothesis (h): 
 
)(
)&(
),(
em
ehm
ehc         (2) 
The details of how c and m can be defined in terms of propositions about our 
model-world (and how h and e should be construed) need not concern us here. 
What is important is that we realise that in Carnap’s logical interpretation degrees 
of probability correspond to degrees of confirmation of some hypothesis, and that 
this manifests itself as logical relations between propositions within a language. 
 As the similarity between equations (1) and (2) already suggests the 
logical interpretation is closely related to both types of Bayesianism. In modern 
literature the logical interpretation is often called a ‘limiting case’ of objective 
Bayesianism12. To see why that is, we return to our example of a situation in 
which an observer is confronted with a certain body of evidence. For someone 
who interprets probability in a logicist sense, the only guide on the road from 
evidence to judgments of probability is logical deduction. About the purely 
objective Bayesian we know that she will say that the prior degrees of belief of 
the observer are completely determined by the evidence, and that the posterior 
degrees of belief follow from the priors with logical rigour. A purely objective 
Bayesian is therefore fully rational. It is clear from this in what sense the logical 
                                           
10 E.g. the Bayesian views of E.T. Jaynes and J.M. Keynes. 
11 For the contents of this paragraph we lean heavily upon (Hájek, 2011).  
12 Cf. (Talbott, 2008) and (Williamson, 2009). 
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interpretation can be regarded as a limiting case of (objective) Bayesianism. The 
sense is one of the ‘degree of rationality’.  
But there is also an essential difference between Carnap’s logical 
interpretation and that of the objective Bayesian. The crux is that in the logical 
interpretation statements of probability express relations between propositions 
within a particular (formal) language, whereas for the objective Bayesian 
language plays no role13. The fact that in the logical interpretation statements of 
probability express linguistic relations makes the validity of a probability 
statement depend on the particular language14 in which the statement is made. 
In a given situation more than one statement of probability can be considered 
‘correct’ as a result of this. In fact, there is always a ‘continuum’ of possible 
languages to describe a chance-event, each corresponding to a different degree 
of probability for the event. For the objective Bayesian, on the other hand, the 
situation is less liberal. The objective Bayesian holds that degrees of probability 
are degrees of belief. We may assume that a rational agent has only one 
particular degree of belief (schizophrenia aside). It follows that in a given 
situation there can be only one statement of probability that is the correct one – 
that is the one that corresponds to the degree of belief of the rational agent. It 
has become clear that there is a crucial difference between the logical 
interpretation of probability and that of the objective Bayesian. 
7. Conclusion 
The preceding sections of this paper have put us in a position where we can 
compare the different perspectives on Stumpf’s concept of probability and 
properly classify Stumpf’s interpretation within the history of probability-theory.   
 The first account of Stumpf’s probability concept that we discussed was 
that of Reichenbach. Although Reichenbach judged Stumpf’s account to be 
coherent, he also believed that the element of subjectivity that is inherent to 
Stumpf’s view renders Stumpf’s probability concept unusable for science. The 
arguments of Reichenbach evidently depend on what notion of ‘objectivity’ we 
adopt, and, consequently, how we characterise subjectivity. Reichenbach argues 
that a change in probability must correspond to a physical change. That is how 
Reichenbach characterises objectivity within the context of probability. According 
to Stumpf, on the other hand, the existence of an underlying physical change 
which is responsible for a change in probability is merely a hypothesis. Stumpf’s 
idea about the objectivity of probability derives from his definition (which we 
encountered on p.4). For Stumpf the concept of probability is objective in very 
restricted sense. Stumpf’s notion of objectivity follows from the requirement that 
degrees of probability conform to the degrees of expectation of a rational 
observer. 
 
„Nennen wir nun ‚objektiv gültig’ dasjenige, was von alle Subjecten bei 
gleicher Urteilsmaterie anerkannt werden muss, so ist das Wahrscheinliche 
objectiv gültig” (Stumpf, 1892a, p. 55). 
 
                                           
13 One might counter that any statement that anyone makes is a statement in a 
certain language. It follows that language always plays a role (if it ever does). 
Then how can it be that language plays no role for the objective Bayesian?  
For the objective Bayesian a degree of probability corresponds to a degree 
of belief, but that does not mean that every degree of belief uniquely corresponds 
to a probability statement. The language used by the logicist is a formal 
language, whereas that of the objective Bayesian may be a natural language. 
14 Provided that this language is a formal language, the choice of a particular 
language corresponds to the definition of a certain measure. 
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A correct understanding of this notion of objectivity is enough to clear Stumpf’s 
name in the face of Reichenbach’s accusations. Reichenbach’s claim that Stumpf’s 
probability concept yields no basis for rational expectation is clearly based upon a 
careless reading of Stumpf’s account. Reichenbach’s claim becomes even more 
surprising if we read the following words of Stumpf: 
 
„Die mathematische Wahrscheinlichkeit wird auch als Mass unserer 
vernünftigen Erwartung bezeichnet.“ (Stumpf, 1892a, p. 56) (Italics in the 
original) 
 
Reichenbach clearly misjudged Stumpf. There is more merit to von Mises’ 
classification of Stumpf as a subjectivist, because the knowledge of a subject 
plays an essential role in Stumpf’s account. We have seen, however, that 
Stumpf’s probability-concept is subjective only in a very restricted sense of the 
word. Kamlah’s characterisation of Stumpf’s probability concept as a logical 
concept of probability is more apropos than the characterisations by Reichenbach 
and von Mises. Kamlah correctly states that Stumpf’s probability concept is of a 
logical nature: Stumpf literally states that statements of probability express 
logical relations between propositions. However, the logical interpretation does 
not incorporate Stumpf’s notion of objectivity. We have seen that in the logical 
interpretation of Carnap (to whom Kamlah explicitly refers (Kamlah, 1987, p. 
108)) an infinite number of different probability judgments may apply to a fixed 
body of evidence (due to the freedom in the choice of the probability measure 
(m) used). In Stumpf’s account such freedom is absent. We see that Kamlah, just 
as Reichenbach and von Mises, has misconstrued Stumpf’s probability concept.  
Although it fails to accurately incorporate Stumpf’s notion of objectivity 
Kamlah’s logical understanding of Stumpf is more to the point than Reichenbach’s 
accusation of unbridled subjectivism. Stumpf himself claims that his interpretation 
of probability is that of the subjective Bayesian. However, this claim is 
inconsistent with his own notion of objectivity. We have seen that the subjective 
Bayesian believes that posterior probabilities are logically connected to prior 
probabilities, but that the choice of these prior probabilities themselves is free 
(and not necessarily rational). Such a free choice squarely contradicts Stumpf’s 
statement that probability has an objective nature. We therefore conclude that 
Stumpf’s probability-concept is best understood as that of the objective Bayesian. 
We end our paper with a speculative remark. To understand why Stumpf 
adopted the stance of the objective Bayesian as opposed to von Kries’ physical 
event spaces, it is instrumental to be conscious of the fact that he did so as a 
psychologist. In the introductory section of his main lecture in 1892 Stumpf 
states that interpreting the theory of probability is of great importance for 
science. Not only has the role of probability theory in the exact sciences grown, 
but it is also of fundamental importance to the ‘moral sciences’ and the 
humanities (Moral- und Geisteswissenschaften) (Stumpf, 1892a, p. 37). Stumpf’s 
reason for believing this derives from his view that all science ultimately depends 
on statistics. In psychological research it is not always easy, or perhaps 
sometimes even impossible, to measure the event spaces that are relevant to von 
Kries’ probability concept. Therefore, the adoption of von Kries’ account of 
probability would rule out (large parts of) psychology as a science. Of course 
Stumpf could not accept a concept of probability that would undermine his own 
work as a scientist. We claim that Stumpf embraced objective bayesianism as a 
way of legitimising his view of psychology as a science. 
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